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GRATUITOUS NURSING SERVICES RENDERED
BY EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS AND OTHER
THIRD PARTIES:
CAN INJURED PARTIES RECEIVE
REIMBURSEMENT UNDER WISCONSIN'S
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Jane Doe1 underwent a mammogram that detected an
abnormality in her left breast. Doe switched doctors shortly thereafter
because of insurance reasons, but not before the doctor who
administered the mammogram gave her strict instructions to have a
follow-up mammogram in three to four months with her new healthcare
provider. Doe's new doctor, however, did not perform a mammogram
for over a year, delaying the diagnosis of what turned out to be a
cancerous tumor. By the time the cancer was finally diagnosed, it had
spread throughout her body and was untreatable. She remained
severely ill and needed significant care until her death over two years
after the cancer's discovery.
Doe's husband and three minor children brought suit against the
second doctor, claiming that he negligently delayed the diagnosis of
Doe's cancer. Their attorneys contended that if the doctor had ordered
a follow-up mammogram, the cancer would have been discovered
sooner and could have been treated.
The care that the woman received during her last two years turned
out to be a controversial topic throughout the lawsuit because it was
rendered gratuitously by her husband, children, and extended family
members. The defense contended that, based on Wisconsin Civil Jury
Instruction 1820, only the value of the spouse's donated services could
be included in the damages.2 Doe's attorneys, however, wished to
1. This hypothetical is loosely based upon a Wisconsin medical malpractice case which
this author worked on extensively while clerking at a personal injury firm the summer after
his first year of law school. The facts have been reprinted with the permission of the
attorneys who worked on the case, with the stipulation that none of the parties' names be
disclosed.
2. The instruction, entitled "Injury to Spouse: Nursing Services: Past and Future," states:
Subdivision - of question __ asks what sum of money will compensate (name) for
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include the gratuitous nursing services donated by all the family
members, even those in the extended family, in their petition for
damages.
The above fact pattern, while only a hypothetical, raises an
important question about the state of the law in Wisconsin regarding
damages calculations: Does Wisconsin's collateral source rule permit
plaintiffs to include the value of nursing services rendered gratuitously
by extended family members or other third persons in their damage
claims?
Wisconsin's collateral source rule has long been that the jury must
consider the value of the nursing services rendered when formulating a
damage award, not the billed or paid-for amount. In other words, a
plaintiff's damages cannot be reduced by the fact that the plaintiff
received some of the care at a discount or for free. However, as
previously mentioned, Wisconsin's jury instruction on the issue only
includes services donated by a spouse, not extended family members.
Because inclusion of services rendered by extended family members
could dramatically increase many plaintiffs' damage claims, resolution
of this question could have a far-reaching effect on personal injury
litigation in Wisconsin.
This Comment discusses the collateral source rule in Wisconsin and
how the rule treats nursing services rendered gratuitously by extended
family members and other third parties. Part II of this Comment offers
a general overview of the collateral source rule, analyzing criticisms of
the rule and justifications for allowing a plaintiff to collect for gratuitous
nursing services in light of the criticisms. Part III discusses the evolution
personal nursing care and services rendered to (his wife) (her husband). If you find
that (name) performed services in nursing and caring for (his wife)(her husband)
and that the services were necessarily rendered because of (her) (his) injuries, you
should name such sum as you feel will fairly and reasonably compensate (name) for
the personal nursing care and services, not exceeding the amount for which (name)
could have employed others to do the work. If you find that for any foreseeable
time in the future (he) (she) will be performing such necessary services, you should
also make reasonable allowances for the future services.
WIS JI-CIVIL 1820 (1992).
3. McLaughlin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 378, 396, 143
N.W.2d 32,40-41 (1966). In McLaughlin, the Wisconsin Supreine Court stated:
The general rule is that a plaintiff who has been injured by the tortious conduct of
the defendant is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical and nursing
services reasonably required by the injury. This is a recovery for their value and not
for the expenditures actually made or obligations incurred.
Id. at 396, 143 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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of gratuitous nursing services cases in Wisconsin and how the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's recent decision in Ellsworth v. Schelbrock,4 that
discusses the collateral source rule, has affected Wisconsin law. Part IV
proposes a new jury instruction for Wisconsin. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the collateral source rule in Wisconsin permits plaintiffs
to include the value of nursing services gratuitously rendered by
extended family members and other third parties.
I1. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
A. Common Law Overview
The collateral source rule has been recognized by the common law
since the nineteenth century.5 While some believe that the New York
Court of Appeals case of Althorf v. Wolfe6 is the earliest American
decision applying the collateral source rule,7 most legal scholars trace
the development of the rule to the United States Supreme Court case of
The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison.8 In Monticello, the defendant-
steamship rammed and sunk the plaintiff-schooner.9 The defendant
asserted that the plaintiff had insurance on the vessel and thus received
full compensation for the damage from the insurance proceeds.' The
Court rejected this argument, ruling that the defendant was not relieved
from liability simply because the plaintiff was insured." While never
4. 2000 WI 63,235 Wis. 2d 678,611 N.W.2d 764.
5. Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46
MINN. L. REv. 669, 671 (1962); Banks McDowell, The Collateral Source Rule-The American
Medical Association and Tort Reform, 24 WASHBURN LJ. 205,205 (1985).
6. 22 N.Y. 355 (1860). In Althorf, the defendant instructed one of his servants to clear
snow and ice from the roof of his house. I. at 355. As the servant did so, some of the snow
and ice struck a passerby and killed him. Id at 356. At trial, defense counsel asked for a jury
instruction that took into consideration the receipt of life insurance proceeds by the
decedent's widow in the determination of damages. Ia- at 358. The judge did not give the
instruction, and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling without discussing the issue. Id. at
367. In his discussion of the case, one author commented: "Perhaps the court thought it too
obvious to be worth discussing that the early accrual of benefits under a life insurance
contract in which the deceased had invested was not a benefit which [a] widow must deduct
when suing for [her husband's] wrongful death." Maxwell, supra note 5, at 671.
7. Maxwell, supra note 5, at 671 n.6.
8. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
9. Id. at 153.
10. Id. at 154.
11. Id. at 155. "The contract with the insurer is in the nature of a wager between third
parties, with which the trespasser has no concern. The insurer does not stand in the relation
of a joint trespasser, so that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others." Id-
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explicitly defining the payment as a collateral source, the Court
explained that the doctrine it applied in this case was well established at
common law. The term "collateral source" was not actually used in
judicial discourse until 1870."3
Despite some states' attempts to modify or abolish the collateral
source rule, 4 the rule is now applied in one form or another throughout
the country. 5  The collateral source rule states generally that "if an
injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a source
wholly independent of the tort-feasor, the payment should not be
deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the
tort-feasor."16 Under this rule, an injured party may be compensated
twice for the same injury. For example, this means that an injured
party in an automobile accident can recover once from a negligent tort-
feasor and once from his or her automobile insurance. 8 Although the
collateral source rule has both evidentiary and damages aspects," this
12. Id.
13. Albert Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 233 (1960).
Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1871), has been credited as the first case to use
the term "collateral." Id. In ruling that the receipt of insurance proceeds must not be
deducted from a plaintiff's damage award, the court stated:
The policy of insurance is collateral to the remedy against the defendant, and was
procured solely by the plaintiff and at his expense, and to the procurement of which
the defendant was in no way contributory. It is in the nature of a wager between the
plaintiff and a third person, the insurer, to which the defendant was in no measure
privy, either by relation of the parties or by contract or otherwise. It cannot be said
that the plaintiff took out the policy in the interest or behalf of the defendant; nor is
there any legal principle which seems to require that it be ultimately appropriated to
the defendant's use and benefit.
Id at 538.
14. See Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward the Abrogation
of the Collateral Source Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 857, 888.
15. Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of
Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1077
(1997).
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Saine, supra note 15, at 1076.
18. See id.
19. L. Timothy Perrin, Comment The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its Impending
Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEx. TECH L. REV. 961,961 (1987).
As a rule of evidence, [the collateral source rule] precludes introduction into
evidence of any benefits the plaintiff obtained from sources collateral to the
defendant. As a rule of damages, it forces the defendant to pay for the entire loss he
caused despite independent recoveries by the plaintiff for the same loss.
Id. In its capacity as both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages, the collateral source rule's
1006 [85:1003
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Comment will focus on the rule only as it pertains to damages.
In its discussion of the collateral source rule as a rule of damages, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[p]ayments made to or
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not
credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable."' D Furthermore, "it is
the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he [or she]
causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives."2"
Put differently, receipt of collateral source payments does not reduce a
judgment against a defendant.2 The Restatement categorizes collateral
sources into four distinct groups: insurance policies, employment
benefits, gratuities, and social legislation benefits.' Wisconsin considers
these same benefits collateral sources.24
Wisconsin law has recognized the collateral source rule since 1908?2
In describing the rule, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, "Wisconsin
has long been committed to the collateral-source rule which provides
that a plaintiff's recovery will not be reduced by the fact that the...
payments were made by some source collateral to [the] defendant. "' By
placing the entire cost of the harmful conduct on the tort-feasor,
Wisconsin courts hope to deter negligent conductY A tort-feasor must
function is to screen from the jury evidence of collateral payments. John L. Antracoli, Note,
California's Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiffs Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37
HASTINGS L. 667, 669 n.24 (1986) (citation omitted). If the jury does not hear evidence of
collateral payments, the belief is that they will not take such payments into account and will
not deduct them from damage calculations. Id
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979).
21. Id. § 920A cmt. b.
22. Antracoli, supra note 19, at 669.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c (1979).
24. Gobis, supra note 14, at 861 n.36. For example, in Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370,
374-75, 214 N.W. 374, 376 (1927), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that disability policies
(insurance policies) were collateral sources. In Ashley v. American Automobile Insurance
Co., 19 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 119 N.W.2d 359, 363 (1963), the court held that a salary paid to an
employee while he was out of work due to an injury (employment benefits) was a collateral
source. In Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transportation Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231,243,201
N.W.2d 745,752 (1972), the court held that gratuitous medical services paid for by the state
(gratuities) were collateral sources. Also, in Merz v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 53 Wis. 2d
47, 54, 191 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1971), the court held that Medicare payments (social legislation
benefits) were collateral sources.
25. Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39, 116 N.W. 633, 634
(1908) (holding that because an insurance contract is an investment contract, it gives a
plaintiff an absolute right of action against a tort-feasor even after insurance benefits have
been paid).
26. Merz, 53 Wis. 2d at 54,191 N.W.2d at 879.
27. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Ct.
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not be allowed to benefit "simply because the victim had the foresight to
arrange, or good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for
injuries and expenses. " '
B. Criticisms of the Collateral Source Rule and Justifications for its
Application
1. Criticisms
Some critics have questioned the fairness of allowing plaintiffs to
receive the value of collateral source payments in their damage awards.29
Nursing services rendered gratuitously by extended family members, as
collateral sources, must withstand these criticisms to be included in a
damage award. While these concerns may be valid, such criticisms can
be logically rebutted and do not justify reducing a plaintiff's damages
simply because the services were donated.
One of the major criticisms of the collateral source rule is that it
creates a windfall for plaintiffs because they receive a double recovery 0
This criticism is based on the fact that even though injured plaintiffs who
receive gratuitous nursing services do not have to pay for them, they can
nevertheless recover for them from the tort-feasor in a damage award.31
Another criticism of the collateral source rule is that it "conflicts
with the compensatory function of tort law. 32 The purpose of tort law is
to make plaintiffs whole again after the accident occurs, or to put
plaintiffs in the same condition as before the accident. The collateral
source rule, however, requires a tort-feasor to pay even though plaintiffs
App. 1985).
28. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, 7,235 Wis. 2d 678,684, 611 N.W.2d 764,767.
29. See generally David Fellman, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral
Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964); Charles W. Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the
Collateral Source Rule, 524 INS. L.i. 545 (1966); Robert Allen Sedler, The Collateral Source
Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant Principle and the Functional Approach, 58
KY. L.J. 36 (1969).
30. Lee R. West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiffs Windfall, 16
OKLA. L. REV. 395, 413 (1963); see also Brian H. Sande, Damages Recoverable for Past
Medical Services, THE VERDICT, Fall 1999, at 15.
31. See West, supra note 30, at 413; see also Sande, supra note 30, at 15.
32. Antracoli, supra note 19, at 670; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901
(1979). "The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are based upon the
purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable. These purposes are: (a) to give
compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms.. Id.
33. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
7-8 (5th ed. 1984).
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have already been compensated.4 Such recovery is akin to the receipt
of punitive damages,35 and punitive damages do not compensate, but
rather punish to discourage other similar offenses.36
A third criticism of the collateral source rule is that it conflicts with
the damage mitigation principle.' This principle, as outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages,
to the extent that this is equitable.
Therefore, using this rationale, if plaintiffs receive nursing services for
free, this amount should be used to offset the damages that tort-feasors
are required to pay. Application of the collateral source rule, however,
contradicts this principle because the receipt of collateral nursing service
benefits does not mitigate the damages.
2. Justifications
These criticisms of the collateral source rule, however, do not
outweigh the justifications. Two primary rationales for the rule have
been enunciated. First and foremost, if there is to be a windfall, the
innocent plaintiff should so benefit, not the defendant.' In a situation
where gratuitous nursing services have been rendered, a court can do
one of two things. A court can either reward the tort-feasors by making
them responsible for an amount less than the full amount of the
plaintiff's medical services, or a court can award the entire amount of
damages to the injured person even though the victim did not pay for
the services.
34. See supra Part lI.A.
35. See Antracoli, supra note 19, at 670. For example, in City of Salinas v. Souza &
McCue Construction Co., 424 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Cal. 1967), the California Supreme Court said
that the double recovery that results from the collateral source rule is equivalent to punitive
damages. See Antracoli, supra note 19, at 670 n.30.
36. KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, § 2, at 9.
37. Gobis, supra note 14, at 861.
38. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)).
39. See supra Part nl.A.
40. West, supra note 30, at 413.
41. Sande, supra note 30, at 15.
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A more just result occurs from the application of the latter of the
two approaches,42 and most jurisdictions have agreed.43 Wisconsin is no
exception, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[A] contrary conclusion would result in giving the tortfeasor a
windfall: the tortfeasor would not have to pay the full amount of
damages he would owe even after taking into account the
amount of contributory negligence.... [T]he better result is to
allow [the plaintiff] to recover that windfall, not [the tortfeasor].
Any windfall in benefits should inure to the injured party, not to
the tortfeasor.'
The approach giving the plaintiff the benefit of the windfall of
gratuitously rendered nursing services must prevail; otherwise tort-
feasors will no longer be responsible for the full amount of the damages
they cause. This would undermine the deterrent effect of tort law and
would encourage undesirable conduct.46
Second, allowing a plaintiff to recover collateral sources, such as
gratuitous nursing services rendered by third parties, ensures that a
plaintiff will be fully compensated.47 For example, no injured party can
truly be compensated for permanent injuries for the loss of a body part."
In addition, a substantial portion of the amount actually awarded to
plaintiffs goes toward attorney's fees.49 While it is true that the
42. See West, supra note 30, at 413-14.
43. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court in
Hudson stated:
Whether it is a gift or the product of a contract of employment or of insurance, the
purposes of the parties to it are obviously better served and the interests of society
are likely to be better served if the injured person is benefited [through the receipt
of a collateral source] than if the wrongdoer is benefited.
Id. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958) ("If there must be a windfall [from
the receipt of collateral source benefits] certainly it is more just that the injured person shall
profit therefrom, rather than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for his
wrongdoing.").
44. Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726,733,512 N.W.2d 749,752 (1993).
45. Sande, supra note 30, at 15.
46. Perrin, supra note 19, at 989-90. Thus, the legal system would be deprived of the
opportunity to correct the wrongdoer. Id.
47. See Gobis, supra note 14, at 862.
48. See Antracoli, supra note 19, at 672 (quoting Hudson, 217 F.2d at 346).
49. See id. The author expounded on the following language from Hudson:
Legal "compensation" for personal injuries does not actually compensate. Not
[85:10031010
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collateral source rule allows plaintiffs to receive larger judgments than
they appear entitled to, the amount that they actually receive more
closely resembles the full compensation they deserve.
III. EVOLUTION OF GRATUITOUS NURSING SERVICES CASES AND THE
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN WISCONSIN
When injured parties use collateral sources such as insurance or
funds from family members to pay for medical services, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has identified such resources as collateral sources and
determined that they must not be used to diminish a plaintiff's damage
award." However, the issue becomes more convoluted when family
members donate their services and time, instead of their money. In such
instances, many defendants, including those in the hypothetical
described at the beginning of this Comment, argue that plaintiffs cannot
recover these amounts.
When looking at the evolution of gratuitous nursing services cases in
Wisconsin, or any issue involving the collateral source rule, it is useful to
draw a distinction between cases decided before and after the 1987
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling in Lambert v. Wrensch.5' While the
pre-Lambert cases demonstrated a clear trend toward recognizing the
value of donated third-party nursing services in a plaintiff's damage
claim, Lambert appeared to severely restrict application of the collateral
source rule? However, in 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
decision in the case of Ellsworth v. Schelbrock clarified the holding in
Lambert and reaffirmed the collateral source rule in Wisconsin.53
A. Pre-Lambert Cases
1. Verhelst Construction Co. v. Galle?
Before Lambert, Wisconsin case law had set a relatively clear
precedent that gratuitous services rendered by any third party were
many people would sell an arm for the average or even the maximum amount that
juries award for loss of an arm. Moreover the injured person seldom gets the
compensation he "recovers," for a substantial attorney's fee usually comes out of it.
Id (quoting Hudson, 217 F.2d at 346).
50. See McLaughlin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 378,396,
143 N.W.2d 32,40-41 (1966).
51. 135 Wis. 2d 105,399 N.W.2d 369 (1987).
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See infra Part III.C.
54. 204 Wis. 96,235 N.W. 556 (1931).
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indeed collateral sources, the value of which should be included in a
plaintiff's recovery. This precedent started in 1931 with Verhelst
Construction Co. v. Galles.
In Verhelst, a twenty-one-year-old male was killed during the course
of his employment after being struck by an automobile driven by the
defendant.5  After paying the worker's compensation award, the
employer brought suit against the defendant to recover the money
paid. 6 The trial court held that the employer could not recover the $200
for funeral expenses because the amount was paid by insurance. ' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, stating that when one who is not
legally responsible for damages pays for them, the wrongdoer is not
relieved of liability.58 While no gratuitous nursing services were actually
rendered in this case by extended family members or other parties, the
court alluded that such services also would be recoverable by a
decedent. 9
2. McLaughlin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway Co.'
After Verhelst, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not discuss the
gratuitous nursing services issue again until the 1966 case of McLaughlin
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway Co. In McLaughlin, a
priest was injured when a train collided with the car in which he was a
passenger." His religious order voluntarily paid his nursing and medical
costs of $1931, and the trial court ruled that this amount could not be
recovered by the plaintiff.6 2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that
when medical and nursing services are rendered gratuitously to an
injured party, the injured party is not precluded "from recovering the
value of those services as part of his [or her] compensatory damages."63
Therefore, a "'plaintiff's recovery will not be reduced by the fact that
55. Id. at 96, 235 N.W. at 557.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 102, 235 N.W. at 558.
59. Id. The court ruled that nursing services gratuitously rendered by family members
are similar to voluntary payments of an injured person's expenses by those other than the
tort-feasor. Id. The victim's damage claim cannot be reduced due to the receipt of these
benefits because "[s]uch payment does not inure to the benefit of the party liable for the item
of damage." Id
60. 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32 (1966).
61. Id. at 382, 143 N.W.2d at 33.
62. Id. at 395, 143 N.W.2d at 40.
63. Id. at 395-96, 143 N.W.2d at 40.
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the medical expenses were paid by some source collateral to the
defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members of the plaintiff's
family, by the plaintiff's employer, or by an insurance company.' "
Thus, the court in McLaughlin ruled that even if a party is not obligated
to repay a source that gratuitously pays for medical bills, such payment
is not deducted from the damage award.6
3. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transportation Corp."
In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again ruled on the issue of
gratuitous services in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transportation Corp. In this case, a bus struck a three-year-old boy
when he ran into the street from in front of a parked automobile.67 The
boy suffered severe brain damage, and his mother sought compensation
for past and future medical expenses and nursing services 6' even though
they were paid for by the state because the boy's custody was
transferred to the state five years after the accident.
The defendants argued that because the woman did not pay for the
services, the $28,000 paid by the government for the services did not fall
under the collateral source rule. 0  The Wisconsin Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that when medical or nursing services are rendered
gratuitously to one who is injured, the injured party is entitled to
recover the value of those services from the tort-feasor on the rationale
that "the recovery has a penal effect on a tortfeasor and the tortfeasor
should not get the advantage of gratuities from third parties.'"" The
amount that a plaintiff could recover included not the amount that was
64. Id. at 396,143 N.W.2d at 40-41 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 395-96,143 N.W.2d at 40. Similarly, in Merz v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 53
Wis. 2d 47, 191 N.W.2d 876 (1971), the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether Medicare payments should inure to the benefit of the tort-feasor. It stated:
Wisconsin has long been committed to the collateral source rule which provides that
a plaintiff's recovery will not be reduced by the fact that the medical payments were
made by some source collateral to defendant. Appellants advanced no cogent
argument why Medicare payments should be exempted from the collateral source
rule.
Id. at 54,191 N.W.2d at 879 (citation omitted). Thus, damage awards will also not be reduced
when government programs pay the bills. Id.
66. 56 Wis. 2d 231,201 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
67. Id. at 233,201 N.W.2d at 747.
68. Id
69. Id. at 241,201 N.W.2d at 751.
70. Id. at 243,201 N.W.2d at 751.
71. Id at 243,201 N.W.2d at 752.
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paid, but rather "the reasonable value of [the] medical costs reasonably
required by the injury.,72 The actual charge is not always the proper
amount on which to base damages, as the court said: "[T]he test is the
reasonable value, not the actual charge, and therefore there need be no
actual charge."7"
4. Redepenning v. Dore74
The same year that the Thoreson decision was issued, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided the case of Redepenning v. Dore, which did not
specifically address gratuitous nursing services rendered by third parties
but nevertheless added another element to the analysis-how to
calculate the value of such services.75 In this case, the driver of a pickup
truck hit the plaintiff and her daughter as they drove to the hairdresser.76
The daughter died,7 and the husband spent five weeks after the accident
caring for his wife.78 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff could include the value of these nursing services in her claim, as
long as the value accurately reflected what the services would
customarily and reasonably cost in the community."
B. Lambert v. Wrensch
While never specifically addressing the issue, these five cases seemed
to show a clear trend in Wisconsin law that gratuitous nursing services
rendered by immediate family, extended family, and third parties were
all collateral sources and therefore a plaintiff could include their value
in a damage claim. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision
in Lambert v. Wrensch altered this precedent and severely limited the
application of the collateral source rule as it applied to nursing services
and unreimbursed medical expenses.
72. Id.
73. Id
74. 56 Wis. 2d 129,201 N.W.2d 580 (1972).
75. Id. at 137,201 N.W.2d at 585.
76. Id. at 131-32,201 N.W.2d at 582.
77. Id at 132,201 N.W.2d at 582.
78. Id. at 137,201 N.W.2d at 585.
79. Id.; see also Moritz v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 13, 27, 133 N.W.2d
235, 243 (1965) (holding "that one who is injured and requires domestic and nursing services
is entitled to recover for the same 'what is customarily charged for similar work' and to the
extent that there is proof that establishes this item of damages to a reasonable certainty")
(quoting Hommel v. Badger State Inv. Co., 166 Wis. 235,245, 165 N.W. 20,23 (1917)).
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In Lambert, the plaintiff brought suit against her husband for
injuries she sustained while a passenger in his car during an automobile
accidentl The plaintiff also joined her husband's insurance company
and the driver of the other vehicle as defendants.8' The plaintiff
received nearly $18,000 for medical expenses from her husband's
insurance, as she was a dependent under the policy." The insurance
company could not receive subrogation for that amount because the
statute of limitations had run, and the insurance company had not
asserted its subrogation right in its answer to the complaint.'
The plaintiff's motion to exclude any evidence that the insurer had
made payments for her medical expenses was denied by the trial judge.'
After trial, the judge also refused to instruct the jury that such payments
were a collateral source and should not be used to compute damages.'
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed these rulings.86
On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that
the insurance company's payments were a collateral source.
Therefore, she believed she should have been able to recover all of her
medical expenses, even those paid for by insurance.8 The court
disagreed, holding that the collateral source rule was inapplicable in this
case because the insurance contract was an indemnity contract and the
insurance company had a right to its subrogation interest. Citing
Heifetz v. Johnson,' the court stated:
80. Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 105,109,399 N.W.2d 369,371 (1987).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 109-10,399 N.W.2d at 371.
83. Id. at 110, 399 N.W.2d at 371-72.
84. Id. at 110, 399 N.W.2d at 371.
85. Id. at 110-11,399 N.W.2d at 372.
86. Id. at 111,399 N.W.2d at 372.
87. Id. at 113,399 N.W.2d at 373.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 117,121,399 N.W.2d at 374-75.
90. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973). In Heifetz, the plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident. I& at 113, 211 N.W.2d at 835. After receiving $2000 for medical
expenses from his liability insurer, he commenced a personal injury action against the
defendant tort-feasor. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff
accepted a payment from his insurer, this operated as an assignment of his claim even if the
policy did not contain a subrogation agreement. Id. at 124,211 N.W.2d at 841. Therefore, the
plaintiff lost his right to sue for any amount received from the insurer and could not recover
the amount that the insurance company paid from the tort-feasor. Id.
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"[S]ince the doctrine of subrogation was designed in part to
prevent double recovery by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff should not
be allowed to recover the full amount free of the subrogation
claim of the insurer which was extinguished by the running of the
statute of limitations against the subrogated insurer. This inures
to the benefit of the defendant in this case, but that is the public
policy expressed in statutes of limitations."91
In other words, statutes of limitations are designed to benefit tort-
feasors when plaintiffs fail to timely file suit? Because the public policy
underlying statutes of limitations favors defendants, a plaintiff should
not be allowed to recover subrogated amounts for past medical expenses
paid by a collateral source after the statute of limitations has run.'
C. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock
After the Lambert decision, speculation abounded that the collateral
source rule did not apply to gratuitous nursing services and medical
expenses paid by third parties because the ruling was seen as a step
toward the complete abrogation of the collateral source rule in
Wisconsin." However, in 2000 the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided
Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, which distinguished the Lambert decision and
upheld the collateral source rule in Wisconsin.95
91. Lambert, 135 Wis. 2d at 119, 399 N.W.2d at 375 (quoting Heifetz, 61 Wis. 2d at 124-
25,211 N.W.2d at 841). The court's holding in Heifetz created confusion within the Wisconsin
legal system concerning the status of the collateral source rule in the state. Gobis, supra note
14, at 869. As Gobis explained:
On the one hand, Heifetz could have been narrowly interpreted to mean that
subrogation in favor of the insurer occurred in any case where a policyholder had
been compensated by an insurer for his or her loss. This interpretation would have
eliminated the collateral source rule. On the other hand, Heifetz could have been
interpreted to hold that subrogation did not occur in all circumstances where an
insurer made payments to its policyholder. This interpretation would not abandon
the collateral source rule.
Idk at 869-70 (citations omitted). The Lambert decision only added to the confusion over
subrogation and the collateral source rule. See id. at 889-90.
92. See Lambert, 135 Wis. 2d at 119,399 N.W.2d at 375.
93. Id.
94. See Gobis, supra note 14, at 889. Lambert classifies personal insurance contracts as
indemnity contracts to which subrogation applies. l Because the majority of personal
insurance contracts now have subrogation clauses and reimburse insurance companies for
their payments to injured plaintiffs, the collateral source rule no longer allows plaintiffs to
keep such funds after recovering them in their damage awards. Id Therefore, the Lambert
decision drastically eroded the application of the collateral source rule. kd
95. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 W163, 22,235 Wis. 2d 678, 693, 611 N.W.2d 764,771.
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In Ellsworth, the defendant struck the back of the vehicle that the
plaintiff was driving early one morning in 1994.96 The defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the accidentY After the impact, the plaintiff's
vehicle ignited into flames." The plaintiff could not immediately
remove herself from the vehicle and as a result, over half of her body
received third-degree bums." She also suffered other substantial and
permanent injuries.0 She required hospitalization for approximately
four months, undergoing several surgical procedures and physical
rehabilitation. 0' She subsequently sued the defendant and his insurer."
At trial, the plaintiff had an expert testify that the amount of
reasonable and necessary past medical services she received was
$597,488.27.'03 The defendant did not introduce any expert testimony of
his own to rebut this amount, but he asserted that the correct amount of
past medical services was $354,941, the amount paid by Wisconsin
Medical Assistance (MA) to the plaintiff's medical providers.'04 Because
plaintiff's medical providers accepted this amount as payment in full for
all of the expenses and the plaintiff was not responsible for the
remaining balance, the defendant argued that the amount paid by MA
was the reasonable value of services provided and that recovery for past
medical expenses should be limited to this amount."' The plaintiff, on
the other hand, argued that the amount MA had paid was a collateral
source and could not be used to show the amount of damages. '°6 The
trial court found for the plaintiff.'0
96. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 229 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 600 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Ct. App. 1999).
This Comment relies on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision to relay the facts of
Ellsworth because the Wisconsin Supreme Court only gives them cursory treatment.
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id
101. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, 1 3,235 Wis. 2d 678, 682,611 N.W.2d 764,766.
102. Id. at 4,235 Wis. 2d at 682,611 N.W.2d at 766.
103. Id. at 4,235 Wis. 2d at 682-83, 611 N.W.2d at 766.
104. Id. at 4,235 Wis. 2d at 683,611 N.W.2d at 766.
105. Id at 16,235 Wis. 2d at 689,611 N.W.2d at 769.
106. Id. at 1 17,235 Wis. 2d at 689-90,611 N.W.2d at 769-70.
107. Id at 4,235 Wis. 2d at 682,611 N.W.2d at 766.
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The defendant argued before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that
the collateral source rule did not apply in this case because the county
appeared to assert MA's subrogation interest.'G' The defendant
reasoned that because the county had a subrogation claim, the correct
amount of damages for the plaintiff's past medical expenses was the
amount of the subrogated interest.' The defendant based this
argument on Lambert v. Wrensch and Heifetz v. Johnson."0 In those
cases, the plaintiffs were not allowed to recover the full amount of the
medical expenses incurred because the statute of limitations had
expired."' The court of appeals limited Lambert and Heifetz to those
cases where the statute of limitations had run and destroyed the
subrogation interest."2 Thus, the court of appeals held that the Lambert
holding, which appeared to abrogate the collateral source rule, only
applied in narrow circumstances and the collateral source rule still
applied with donated medical service payments.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, adding that the
collateral source rule places full responsibility for a tort-feasor's conduct
upon the tort-feasor."4 The court stated that the defendant must not be
allowed to benefit from the fact that MA paid for the plaintiff's bills. 5
The amount proven by the plaintiff through expert testimony was the
proper amount on which to base damages, not the value that MA
decided to pay."6 The court concluded:
In keeping with precedent and well-established tort policy,
we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to Medical
Assistance benefits. The injured party may establish and recover
the reasonable value of the medical services received gratuitously
via Medical Assistance. The state's subrogated amount is
deducted from this recovery, and the injured party is entitled to
any remainder. As a result, the responsibility for the victim's
injury remains fully on the wrongdoer. '
108. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 229 Wis. 2d 542,555,600 N.W.2d 247,253 (Ct. App. 1999).
109. Id
110. Id. at 558, 600 N.W.2d at 254. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the cases.
111. Id
112. Id
113. See id
114. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, T 17, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 689, 611 N.W.2d 764,
769.
115. Id
116. Id at 17, 235 Wis. 2d at 689-90, 611 N.W.2d at 769.
117. Id. at 1 22, 235 Wis. 2d at 693,611 N.W.2d at 771.
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With this holding, the court clearly and unmistakably upheld the
collateral source rule's vitality in Wisconsin, specifically as it pertains to
gratuitous medical service payments.
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: A NEW JURY INSTRUCTION FOR
WISCONSIN
Based on the case law prior to Lambert and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's reaffirmation of the collateral source rule in Schelbrock, the
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction concerning gratuitous nursing services
should be changed to more accurately reflect the law. While the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the issue of
whether nursing services rendered gratuitously by extended family
members and third parties can be included in a damage claim, the
holdings of all cases discussing gratuitous nursing services since 1931
clearly support such a proposition."'
For example, in Verhelst, no nursing services were ever actually
offered by an extended family member.119 However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court clearly held that if someone who is not responsible for
an expense "voluntarily pays [for] the item for the benefit of the injured
person.., or [when] a member of one's family renders without charge
services as a nurse for the value of which a tortfeasor is liable, this does
not relieve the tortfeasor from liability for that item."' 2  Thus, this
holding intimates that had any services been rendered, they would have
been recoverable by the decedent's estate.
Similarly, in McLaughlin, the priest's religious order did not actually
donate nursing services, but rather it only paid for the medical
expenses. 2' The court, however, made no distinction between nursing
services paid by another party and nursing services gratuitously
rendered by another party;" nor did the court limit recovery for services
based on the people who rendered them.2 Rather, the court looked at
the value of such services and said that a plaintiff can recover the value,
118. See discussion supra Part III.A.
119. Verhelst Constr. Co. v. Galles, 204 Wis. 96,102,235 N.W. 556,557 (1931).
120. IL at 102,235 N.W. at 558.
121. McLaughlin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 378, 395,
143 N.W.2d 32,40 (1966).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 395-96,143 N.W.2d at 40.
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regardless of who donated the services.'24 Therefore, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is willing to recognize an injured party's recovery for
nursing services that are voluntarily paid or donated by either third
parties or extended family members.
The facts in Thoreson also do not directly concern services rendered
gratuitously by extended family members, but rather those donated by
the state. 5 However, the court once again did not limit the recovery for
nursing services to a specific set of individuals, stating: "Under this
theory of recovery, the fact that necessary medical and nursing services
are rendered gratuitously to one who is injured should not preclude the
injured party from recovering the value of those services as part of his
compensatory damages. "'2 Therefore, no matter who pays for or
donates the services, the court held that plaintiffs can recover their
reasonable value in the damage award, not merely the actual charge."
Finally, even though Redepenning dealt only with a husband's
nursing services, nowhere in the opinion did the Wisconsin Supreme
Court state that the recovery was limited to a spouse's services. The
court merely said: "The reasonable value of nursing services made
necessary because of the injury is a compensable item."'" Based upon
this statement, one could argue that had an extended family member or
another third party gratuitously rendered nursing services, the court
would have recognized this in the award.
With this precedent as a guide, clearly a new jury instruction in
Wisconsin on the topic of gratuitous nursing services must be written.
This Comment proposes the following instruction using Wisconsin Civil
Jury Instruction 1820 as a template, with the italicized words indicating
the altered portions of the instruction:
Subdivision __ of question __ asks what sum of money will
compensate (name) for personal nursing care and services
rendered to (name of injured party). If you find that (name) or
any other third party performed services in nursing and caring for
(name of injured party) and that the services were necessarily
rendered because of (her)(his) injuries, you should name such
sum as you feel will fairly and reasonably compensate (name) for
124. Id at 396, 143 N.W.2d at 40-41.
125. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 243, 201 N.W.2d
745,751 (1972).
126. Id at 243,201 N.W.2d at 752.
127. Id.
128. Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 137,201 N.W.2d 580,585 (1972).
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the personal care and services, not exceeding the amount for
which (name) could have employed others to do the work. If
you find that for any foreseeable time in the future (he)(she) or
any other third party will be performing such necessary services,
you should also make reasonable allowances for the future
services.1 9
Such a change in the instruction would not deviate drastically from how
the Wisconsin Supreme Court views the topic. It would merely
explicitly state the court's true intent, which has been implicit in every
gratuitous nursing case decided before Lambert.
Recognizing a jury instruction that allows plaintiffs to recover for
nursing services gratuitously rendered by third parties would be
perfectly consistent with much of the case law in other jurisdictions.130
While a minority of states still do not allow such recovery,"' the majority
view is that a plaintiff can recover the value of these services."
129. WIS. JI-CIVIL1820 (1992) (alterations added).
130. See Annotation, Damages for Personal Injury or Death as Including Value of Care
and Nursing Gratuitously Rendered, 90 A.L.R.2d 1323,1334-35 (1963) [hereinafter Damages].
131. West, supra note 30, at 402. See, e.g., Beckert v. Doble, 134 A. 154, 155 (Conn.
1926) (holding that a plaintiff suing for personal injuries inflicted by defendant's dog could
recover the value of her husband's nursing services but not those donated by her daughter
because the plaintiff "was [not] subjected to any expense or loss by reason of [the daughter's]
temporary sacrifice.. . nor [did the daughter make a] claim upon the father for compensation
for such services"); Indianapolis & Martinsville Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 100 N.E. 101,
105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912) (holding that a husband could not recover the value of services
rendered to his wife by her mother and other relatives after she was struck by one of the
defendant's cars and later died because the services were performed without a promise to
repay); Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 168 N.W. 940, 942 (Mich. 1918) (holding that the
plaintiff could not recover for gratuitous nursing services rendered by him to his wife after she
was injured by the defendant's runaway horse because he did not have a contract to be paid
by them); Woeckner v. Erie Elec. Motor Co., 37 A.2d 936, 937 (Pa. 1897) (holding that the
plaintiff could not recover for the services rendered to his infant child after she was run over
by the defendant's automobile because "[t]he duties performed by them in the care of the
injured child cost the plaintiff nothing, and caused him no pecuniary loss, and they cannot be
made the ground of a recovery by him").
132. See Damages, supra note 130, at 1334-35. In classifying this view as the majority
view, one legal scholar has stated:
The general rule is that even though valuable services are rendered to the
injured plaintiff by doctors, hospitals, nurses, members of the family and the like,
entirely gratuitously, the plaintiff may still show the value of the services and claim
such amount as a part of his damage, and the defendant is barred by the collateral
source rule from showing that the plaintiff did not in fact pay for or incur liability for
the services.
Peckinpaugh, supra note 29, at 548.
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Some states, similar to Wisconsin, have not directly ruled on the
issue but rather have suggested that such services can be included in the
damage award.133 For example, in a seminal Iowa case on the topic,
Scurlock v. City of Boone,' the plaintiff's wife was seriously injured
when she fell on the sidewalk.135 The plaintiff brought suit against the
municipality for his wife's personal injuries, claiming that the city
negligently maintained an unsafe sidewalk.36 The Iowa Supreme Court
held that the husband could collect the reasonable value of the nursing
services he rendered to his wife.37 While no extended family members
or any other third party performed services in this case, the court
nevertheless noted that "where the nursing and attendance are
furnished by the members of the injured one's family, it is the general
holding that the jury may determine from its own knowledge of such
matters what amount should be allowed as reasonable compensation for
such service.' 3  This dictum suggests that if services had been
performed by extended family members, the plaintiff could have
recovered their reasonable amount.
Some states, however, have directly ruled on the issue.'39 For
example, in Little v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'4 the
plaintiff's wife was injured in an accident, and her mother helped care
for her and her children for five months .41 Even though there was
conflicting evidence as to whether the services were rendered
gratuitously or with the expectation of payment, 42 the Louisiana Court
of Appeals held that the husband was entitled to recover the value of
the services rendered by his wife's mother.'43
Similarly, in the Georgia case of Howard v. Hall,'44 the plaintiff's son
was injured when he was hit by the defendant's automobile.45 Most of
the care the child received after the accident was performed by the
133. See Damages, supra note 130, at 1334-35.
134. 121 N.W. 369 (Iowa 1909).
135. Ia- at 370.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 372.
138. 1&t
139. See Damages, supra note 130, at 1334-35.
140. 136 So. 2d 457 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
141. Id. at 457.
142. Id. at 457-58.
143. Id. at 458.
144. 145 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
145. Id. at 70.
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child's mother and grandmother.14 The Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the father was entitled not only to the value of nursing care
furnished by the mother, but also the care rendered by the child's
grandmother. 47 A majority of states follow such practices.148
Based on the precedent established by Wisconsin case law and using
the cases discussing the topic from other states as a guide, the Wisconsin
jury instruction must be changed to accurately reflect the current law.
Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to the inclusion of such services in their
damage awards. The cases in Wisconsin, and most of the case law from
other states, support this proposition. Logically, the next step is to
change the instruction so plaintiffs like Jane Doe,149 who have suffered
injuries and consequently have received gratuitous nursing services from
extended family members and other third parties, can recover.
V. CONCLUSION
After examining the case law in Wisconsin, this Comment
concludes that nursing services rendered gratuitously by extended
family members and other third parties can be included in a plaintiff's
damage claim in Wisconsin. Like a majority of other states, Wisconsin
clearly treats such reimbursements as collateral sources. After the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the collateral source rule in
Schelbrock, there is no reason to believe that the court would not
consider gratuitous services rendered by third persons collateral sources
if such a question ever reached its courtroom. The many criticisms
against such an approach, while seemingly valid, do not justify giving
tort-feasors the benefit of gratuitous payments when they are the reason
the care had to be rendered in the first place.
The Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction on the topic must be changed
to accurately reflect this trend in the law. This change would save
plaintiffs like Jane Doe countless hours of time and money litigating the
146. Id. at 76.
147. 1I
148. See, e.g., Dahlin v. Kron, 45 N.W2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1950) (holding that a "parent
suing for injuries to his minor child may recover the value of services rendered gratuitously by
the other parent or by members of the family... [if] such services [are] necessitated by the
injuries in question") (citations omitted); Drogmund v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 98 S.W. 1091,1094
(Mo. Ct. App. 1906) (holding that a father suing for injuries to his minor son could be
compensated for nursing services rendered to the boy by family members); Degen v. Bayman,
241 N.W.2d 703, 709 (S.D. 1976) (holding that medical services donated by a hospital must
not be deducted from a plaintiff's damage award).
149. See supra Part I.
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topic. This change would also help to make these plaintiffs who suffered
accidents through no fault of their own whole again.
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